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Abstract This paper1 proposes an abstract mathematical frame for describing some fea-
tures of cognitive and biological time. We focus here on the so called “extended present”
as a result of protentional and retentional activities (memory and anticipation). Memory,
as retention, is treated in some physical theories (relaxation phenomena, which will in-
spire our approach), while protention (or anticipation) seems outside the scope of physics.
We then suggest a simple functional representation of biological protention. This allows
us to introduce the abstract notion of “biological inertia”.
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Introduction
The notions of “memory” and “anticipation” are analyzed here from a temporal perspec-
tive. By this, we propose a simple mathematical approach to retention and protention
that are apparently shared by all organisms, albeit rudimentarily. Moreover, in life phe-
nomena, memory is essential to learning and it is oriented towards action, the grounding
of protention. Our approach will allow to address the issue of what we call “biological
inertia”, a form of “continuation” of ongoing action, derived from the notions above. The
frame is purely mathematical and abstract: only practitioners will be able to give values
to our coefficients and develop, possibly, concrete applications of the approach, from cell
biology to human cognition. Our aim is to give a precise and relevant meaning to notions
that are usually treated in a rather informal fashion and unrelated between one another,
such as those of time of representation, time of retention and time of protention.
A long phenomenological tradition introduces an important distinction between mem-
ory and retention, on the one hand, and anticipation and protention on the other. In short,
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erences), a dear friend and “maıˆtre a` penser”, who contributed to the key ideas. Francis passed away in
february 2008: we continue here our inspiring discussions and joint work.
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the common meaning of “memory” seems to essentially refer to a “conscious reconstruc-
tion” of something that was experienced (very well put by Edelman as a “brain which
sets itself back into a previously experienced state”). Anticipation would be its temporal
opposite — the awareness of an expectation, of a possible future situation. Memory and
anticipation do not, a priori, have a biological characteristic time, a notion which is es-
sential to our analysis. In our approach, instead, possibly pre-conscious retention is to be
seen as an extension of the present; it is the present which is “retained”, during a brief in-
terval of time (related to what will be called its characteristic time) for the objective of the
action (and of perception), it is a form of extension of the immediate past into the present.
For example, when listening to a word or a phrase, we retain the part which has already
occurred for a certain (characteristic) duration of time. The mental duration of a phrase,
particularly of a musical “phrase”, is needed for grasping meaning or a melody (see for
example Perfetti and Goldman (1976); Nicolas (2006)): it is the present which leaves a
trace the time necessary for action or, possibly, for subsequent awareness. But protention
(as preconscious anticipation) is essential to appreciate a melody or understand a phrase.
When reading, the analysis of saccadic eye movements demonstrates that we first look at
least at half of the word following the one we are reading, see Wildman and Kling (1978).
This protentional behaviour participates in the reconstruction of meaning: we appear to
make sure of the meaning of the word we are reading by making a partial guess upon the
following word.
Technically, protention will be given by a temporal mirror image, as it extends reten-
tion forwards into time. Protention is, above all, the tropism inherent to action performed
by any life form. This point is at the center of our approach: we call retention and pro-
tention these particular aspects of memory and of anticipation that are specific to all life
forms – a sort of present which is extended in both directions. Thus we do not limit our
analysis to the phenomenological use of these words, inasmuch it limits their meaning
to situations that can be examined through conscious activities. We believe that this ex-
tension to pre-conscious activities remains compatible with (and helps to understand) its
classical usage, particularly such as described by Van Gelder (1999) and Varela (1999)
who develop the concepts of intentionality, retention and of protention, introduced and
discussed in length by Husserl in his analysis of human consciousness.
In this paper, it is then a question of trying to propose an elementary modelization
of these inevitably fuzzy notions, one which is as rudimentary as possible, but one that
can nevertheless support discussions regarding their precise conceptualization and their
increasingly thorough mathematization. The introduction of the notions of “biological
inertia” and “global protention” are, typically, a consequence of the generative power of
mathematics.
To our aim, we will define some basic principles and more specific notions, after some
methodological preliminaries.
Methodological remarks
This paper belongs to series of texts Bailly and Longo (2011, 2008, 2009); Bailly et al
(2011) whose attempted aim is not to reconstruct the physico-mathematical complexity
of some aspects of biology, but to propose firstly and above all a proper biological per-
spective. We believe that the theoretical differentiation between theories of inert and of
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living phenomena requires, among other things, a change in the relevant parameters and
observables. As long as the actions of living organisms, including their cognitive perfor-
mances which occur the moment that life appears (in this sense, we speak of protention
and of retention in the amoeba or the paramecium), are analyzed within physical space-
time, the physico-mathematical takes precedent over the specificity of the biological. For
example, the formidable mathematics of morphogenesis, from phyllotaxy to the analysis
of the fractal structures of organs, organize the results of friction in the growth of living
organisms according to physical geodesics. This friction is nevertheless shaped within
physical space-time (fractality optimizes the occupation of physical space, the exchange
of energy by a surface within a volume . . . ). In all of these cases, the spatio-temporal and
energetic parameters and observables enable a very interesting and often technically very
difficult analysis. This is an approach of the physical complexity of living phenomena and
of its material structures. We could also say the same of analyses of networks of cells, of
which the most complex are neural networks. Informational interaction, often a gradient
of energy, enables to develop a theory, now very rich from the mathematical standpoint, of
these formal networks of which increasingly important applications are being considered
for the construction of machines that are somewhat intelligent (at last).
In this paper, our mathematics will not go beyond a few equations which could be
presented to high school students. What matters in our view is approaching biological
time according to its own specificity, by starting with some invariants which appear to
be exclusively specific to living phenomena, as we did in Bailly and Longo (2011), or
with properties that are not treated by current physical theories, as protention here. In
Bailly et al (2011), we proposed a two dimensional representation of biological time as a
mathematical frame to accomodate the autonomous (internal) biological rhythms (cardiac,
respiratory, metabolic rhythms . . . ). In the perspective of this paper, one may understand
the expectation or anticipation of a rhythm to iterate, as a minimal form of protention:
once rhythms are installed, the organism is “tuned” to (and “expects”) their iteration.
Before developing a further geometrization of biological-time, we will face yet an-
other taboo of physicalism in biology: the inverted causality specific to protention. We
will not present a physical theory of teleonomy, but will use as data the evidence of proten-
tional behaviours that may be observed in any life form. When the paramecium, encircled
by a ring of salt, tries after many attempts to break through the obstacle, risking its own life
and possibly even succeeding Misslin (2003), we can take note of the retention/memory-
learning of what we see and of the ensuing teleonomic gesture (a protention) and develop
an adequate theory (see Saigusa et al (2008)). Likewise, when we hear that the brain,
prior to a saccadic eye movement, in an obvious anticipation, prepares the correspond-
ing primary cortex which is apt to receive the new signal (see Berthoz (2002)), there is
certainly an underlying physico-chemical mechanism which will one day enable to grasp
the phenomenon by means of physical causality, a causality which may need to be in-
vented. For the moment, let’s consider these phenomena as a form of protention to be
analyzed (correlated, formalized . . . ) by a theory specific to living phenomena, even if it
has no correspondence or meaning within current physical theories. Then, the unification
with the physico-chemical theories may be better considered, in order to evidentiate the
physico-chemical components which underlie these phenomena. As a matter of fact, uni-
fication will be possible only when we will have two theories to compare to one another,
both theories being as mathematized as possible. We are talking about unification and not
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reduction, since physicists aim to unify the relativistic and quantum fields and not perform
a reduction of the one theory to the other: string theory and non-commutative geometry
aims the construction of a new unified frame which presents a new perspective for both
theories. The mathematics to be found in the following pages will give us the advantage
of formalization: it forces to specify concepts and to stabilize them as much as possible
(this is what mathematics is first about). Maybe that which follows is false, but it should
then be possible to say so in relation to a precise formulation.
1 Characteristic time and correlation lengths
The notion of “characteristic time”, which we inherit here from physics, appears to be
very important in biology as well: it concerns the unity of the living individual because,
for example, fluxes and their transport entail lengths and, therefore, relevant transport
times. We will also speak of characteristic times for retention and protention.
For example, according to the size of the organism, there appears to be two sorts
of transport processes. For large organisms, it would be of a “propagational” type (vp
velocity, along networks and “channels”) with a typical correlation length of Lp = vpτ ,
where τ represents the characteristic time. For smaller organisms (cells, for example), it
would rather be of a “diffusional” type (diffusion coefficient D, due to molecular diffusion
processes) and the typical correlation length would be Ld = (Dτ)
1
2 .
We stress the difference regarding dependency in function of time: linear in one case,
as a power of 12 in the other.
Two complementary remarks:
• The size of the organism also affects structures determining the mode of transport,
for example the respiratory function (oxygen transport): in the case of small organ-
isms (insects, for example) the transport is performed by tracheas (or even pores),
multitudes of little cylinders where the air diffuses in order to reach the cells. In
the case of large organisms (fish, mammals), transportation and exchanges are per-
formed by means of gills or of lungs, centralized anatomic structures which present
the fractal geometries we evoked above and which enable to conciliate difficultly
compatible constraints (efficiency, steric limitation, homogeneity), and then by var-
ious sorts of vascular systems. Transportation, in this last case, is also much more
of a “propagational” type (even if diffusion does play a role, namely in bronchioles).
• These considerations essentially apply to various structural aspects responding to
identical functions. The functional aspect responds for its part very generally to
common scaling laws (the metabolism which corresponds particularly to oxygen
intake, the variegated rhythmicities, the relaxation times . . . ). It therefore appears
that the modes of transport associated to identical functions can be different and can
correspond to different anatomic structures (tracheas, gills, bronchial trees/lungs).
This is the well-known phenomenon of analogy of structures in evolutionary biol-
ogy.
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Finally, account taken of these remarks, since the characteristic times τ mostly scale as
W
1
4
f , where Wf is the mass of the intended organism (see Lindstedt and Calder III (1981);
Savage et al (2004)), it is necessary to expect the correlation lengths to scale differently
according to the mode of transport: respectively Lp in W
1
4
f and Ld in W
1
8
f , following the
definitions of Lp and Ld .
In the sequel, our characteristic times will more precisely refer to “relaxation times”,
still in analogy to physics (see next footnote), yet in properly biological frame, in relation
to retention and protention.
1.1 Critical states and correlation length
The physics of criticality and self-organized systems has massively entered the domain
of biology since early ideas by Nicolis and Prigogine (1977), Bak et al (1988), Kauffman
(1993) . . . We further extended this approach, in direct reference to far from equilibrium
systems in the sense of Prigogine, by considering living entities as being in an “extended
critical situation”, beyond the pointwise analysis of critical transitions proper to physical
theories, see Bailly and Longo (2008).
It is interesting now to consider that physical criticality is associated with a so-called
critical slowdown (see for example Suzuki et al (1982): the relaxation time of a system
tends to infinity when it goes near the critical point. The qualitative meaning of these
situations in biology is that the effect of a stimuli would take a long time to stabilize (or,
more generally, the organism would take a long time to “react” or “adjust”), if one views
life as close or in an (extended) critical state. In particular, criticality would lead to very
slow cognitive reactions if reaction needs a stabilization.
More generally, also in an information theoretic perspective, the elaboration/reaction
time is necessarely slow in an organism with long correlations in space and slow character-
istic time of the individual components of the system. However organisms and especially
metazoans must often react quickly and are able to do so. Consequently, biological orga-
nization provides a solution to this paradox. This solution is to compensate this slowness
by preparing the organism to a forthcoming stimulus in advance. We will try to provide
a simple framework to tackle these properties, by an analysis of protention and biological
inertia. Of course, in this context, perception itself is co-determined by this protentional
activity.
2 Retention and protention.
2.1 Principles
We therefore consider retention R by specifying it under the form:
Rk(t0, t) at an instant t of an anterior “event” e of nature k at time t0,
For short and if needed, we will pose that ek0 = e
k(t0) (where t0 ≤ t).
Virtual protention, of an event of the same nature ek1 = e
k
t1 at moment t of an ulterior in-
stant t1 (t ≤ t1) will be noted VPk(t, t1). However, (actual) protention will be considered as
a function also of retention Rk because, and this is an essential principle of our approach,
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in the absence of the retention of an event of nature k there will be no possible protention
for an event of such nature. We will therefore have Pk(Rk, t, t1) = 0, for Rk = 0. For the
sake of simplicity, we described this dependence of protention on retention as a linear
dependence and our (actual) protention, Pk = RkVPk(t, t1), will express this2. Moreover, in
conformity with our previous analyses, we will pose that this protention is a monotonous
increasing function of the retention in question, that is ∂Pk∂Rk ≥ 0.
2.2 Specifications
On the basis of the distinction made above, we have thus introduced the notions of re-
tention and of virtual protention, as “immediate” and “passive” memory and anticipation
in order to express the fact that what we have are phenomena that do not stem from
the intentionality related to a conscious activity of a subject (generally endowed with
a more or less elaborate nervous system), but to simple processes of biological reac-
tion/stimuli/response, of which many primitive organisms in relationship to their environ-
ment are the locus. To the end of developing this point of view, we now introduce distinct
concepts with effects which we propose to represent by means of simple functions, mainly
relaxation functions and their combinations3.
More specifically, we will first define the retention function:
R(t0, t) = aR exp
(
t0− t
τR
)
(1)
t0 is the time of occurrence of an event which is the object of the retention, t is the present
moment (t > t0); τR is the characteristic time associated to the decrease of the retention as
we move away form the occurrence of the event. Notice that when τR tends to 0, R(t0, t)
tends to 0. aR is a coefficient which can be associated to an individual or to a species, for
example, in comparison to others of which such faculties are more or less developed.
We propose to use relaxation functions, because the loss of retention, by moving away
from the moment of the beginning of a phrase or, more generally, from the beginning of
any action (including listening), can be considered as a sort of “return to equilibrium”. A
necessary return if we want to grasp the meaning of the ensuing phrase or action. This,
obviously, does not preclude us from maintaining a memory of a more long-term past
(the initial part of a discourse, for instance): we limit ourselves to an analysis of the local,
pre-conscious effect which contributes to the extended present of an ongoing activity.
How may we now formally define virtual protention, a property which belongs only
to living phenomena? We propose to make it mathematically intelligible by means of
a temporal symmetry with regard to R (time t will change sign). So we define, by a
symmetry adjusted by two new parameters, aP and τP, a virtual protention. Now, time t1
2 After reading a draft of this paper, L. Manning gave us references to IRM data confirming the neu-
rophysiological and neuroimaging evidence for protention and the dependence of protention on retention:
Szpunar et al (2007); Botzung et al (2008). Further, more specific experiments would be required in order
to quantify the coefficients we introduce here and check/adjust the linearity of this dependence.
3Relaxation functions are among the simplest decreasing functions enabling to define a characteristic
time τ in physics, they often represent the basic model for the return to the equilibrium of a system that was
initially brought out of equilibrium, with the speed at which the system returns to the equilibrium fe of the
system’s f function ( d fdt ) remaining proportional to this interval
d f
dt =− | f− fe|τ .
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is the time of the event to be anticipated and which is in the future of the present instant t
(t1 > t), in the form of the function:
VP(t, t1) = aP exp
(
t− t1
τP
)
(2)
Where the different parameters, aP and τP, play the same mutatis mutandis role as those
which intervene in R (cf fig. A). In particular, τP = 0 leads to VP(t, t1) = 0.
Finally, we define protention P(t, t0, t1) by the product RVP:
P(t, t0, t1) = R(t0, t)VP(t, t1) = aPaR exp
[
t0− t
τR
]
exp
[
t− t1
τP
]
(3)
The (linear) dependance of P on R, according to the principles stated above, emphasizes
that such a capacity can only exist, phenomenologically speaking, if there exists in one
form or another a sort of “memory” R (retention) relative to the event of which the reiter-
ation or something resembling it is to be anticipated (we are aware that we are making a
strong but empirically plausible hypothesis here, see footnote 2). In our view, the specific
traits of this “expectation” of an unknown future, protention, is not exactly symmetrical
with regard to the retention of a known past. And this by the fact that protention depends
on retention – and not conversely – and that, by its nature, it remains “potential” (it is the
expectation of a “possible” event).
In the case where R = 0 (complete absence of retention), the protention is cancelled
out by the fact that there no longer exists any referent enabling to anticipate the expected
event.
Still from the phenomenological standpoint, we will expect that in general τP τR,
that is, that the characteristic time of retention be greater than that associated to protention
P (in order to “anticipate”, it is first necessary to “remember”, as stressed above). So the
contribution of VP in the definition of P (the second exponential in τ−1P ), evolves more
rapidly than that of retention for a same concerned duration. And we will always have
P ≤ aPR, as a function of time t, and this for any values of τP and τR (P = aPR being
achieved only in the very moment that the time to be anticipated is the actual present, that
is for t = t1 and hence exp
[
t−t1
τP
]
= 1 ).
To make the role of the parameter t more explicit, with regard to the interval (t0, t1)
and to the characteristic times τP, τR, some simple algebraic manipulations enable to put
the expression P in the form of the product of a function of t and of two coefficients solely
dependent on t0 and t1, that is:
P(t) = aRaP exp
[
τR− τP
τRτP
(t− t0)
]
exp
[
t0− t1
τR
]
exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
(t0− t1)
]
(4)
2.3 Comments
First, we should notice that τRτP(τR−τP) is an interesting quantity: it has the dimension of a
time and is the caracteristic time of P(t).
When τP tends to τR, this quantity tends to infinity, and respectively (τR−τP)τRτP tends to 0.
This means that when τP is close to τR, P(t) is almost stationary as a function of t.
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(t)t0 t1
Virtual Protention (VP ) Retention (R)
Protention(P ) Biological Inertia (I)
Figure 1: Illustration of the basic quantities we define. Notice that protention is a growing
function of time.
0
1
2
3
(t)t0 t1
c = 1 c = 0.8
c = 0.2 c = 0.01
Figure 2: Protention for various values of the ratio c = τPτR . We observe that small value
of c leads to a sharp curve near t1 whereas value close to 1 are flat in the interval. We will
discuss the biological meaning of this case in section 3.
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On the contrary,when τR  τP, minor changes in time strongly affect P(t). More pre-
cisely, P(t) is small when far from t1 (and close to t0), while it is very sensistive to (small)
changes of t, when t is close to t1. This means that, in this condition, the vicinity of the
virtual event is where the effect of protention is important, see figure 2.
It is crucial, however, to understand that protention, for example in the case of a cognitive
situation, is not empirically associated with a change of behaviour, but with the speed of
this change of behaviour. This suggests a way to approach these quantities empirically
by a comparison of the reaction time between situations where the event associated with
retention (at time t0) occurs and when it doesn’t: in the first case, a more sudden change is
then to be expected close to the the expectation time t1. Alternatively, the situation when
the event at time t0 occurs but where the event (at time t1) doesn’t occur allow to eviden-
ciate the presence of protention and to see a part of its effects, it is the case of amoeba in
Saigusa et al (2008). However, in many situations, the effect of protentional action will
consist in a “sensibilization” to the virtual stimuli with the preparation of a response. This
may lead to no behavioural change when the virtual stimuli doesn’t happen, but leads to
a change of organization associated with the preparation of the response (including at the
sensory level) and possibly to a greater sensitivity to noise.
2.4 Global protention
One may wonder when protention is maximal for a given individual. In our approach,
the first possible answer is given by looking at the diagram in figure 2: this quantity is
maximal close to t1. However, we can refine the question (and the answer) by looking
at the global amount of protention along the intended interval [t0, t1]. As protention is
both variant and contravariant in the size of [t0, t1] (see definition 3), this question has a
non-obvious answer.
For this purpose, we define the notion of global protention, which is the sum (the
integral) of protention over time, between t0 and t1.
GP(t1− t0) =
∫ t1
t0
P(t)dt (5)
=
aRaPτRτP
τR− τP exp
[
t0τP− t1τR
τRτP
](
exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
t1
]
− exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
t0
])
(6)
=
aRaPτRτP
τR− τP
(
exp
[
t0− t1
τR
]
− exp
[
t0− t1
τP
])
(7)
This quantity has a maximum for t1− t0 = τPτRτR−τP ln(
τR
τP ), this maximum is a compromise
between the need to give the protention time to have effect (covariant dependence on
the size of [t0, t1]) and the need to have instants in [t0, t1] that are close both to t0 and t1
(contravariance). This result means that there is a specific duration between the past event
and the future event which optimize the protentional effects. This seems to be consistent
with the results in Saigusa et al (2008), since these authors found that a specific value of
the delay t1−t0 (in our notation) leads to a greater protentional effect, that is the functional
dependency on this interval of time has a maximum (a non-obvious fact). In section 3 we
will go back to the relevant ratio c = τPτR .
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01
2
(t1 − t0)τP τRτR−τP ln(
τR
τP
)
0, 0 0, 2 0, 4 0, 6 0, 8 1, 0
(c)
Figure 3: Global protention. When considered as a function of the length of the time
interval (LEFT), there is a maximum which corresponds to the greater effect of the couple
Protention/Retention. RIGHT, we see the global protention as a function of c = τPτR .
3 Biological inertia
Consider now a relaxation phenomenon in physics, typically given byΦ(t)= d exp
[
t0−t
τR
]
.
If time t1 > t0 is given, one may decompose Φ(t) as
Φ(t) = d exp
[
t0− t1
τR
]
exp
[
t1− t
τR
]
(8)
The coefficient, not depending on t, that is d exp
[
t0−t1
τR
]
, is the “residual” at time t1 and it
may be understood as a form of “inertia” of the intended relaxed quantity (for example, it
corresponds to “what remains” at time t1 of a compound which decay with characteristic
time τR). This coefficient is constant in the interval and decreases for increasing t1.
In eq. (4) one has the following factors that do not depend on t:
aRaP exp
[
t0− t1
τR
]
exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
(t0− t1)
]
(9)
The first exponential term corresponds to a physical inertia, let’s call it Iϕ(t0, t1). Then,
we can consider that the other coefficient of protention represents a biological inertia, in
the interval [t0, t1], depending on the biological constants aR, aP, τR and τP:
I(t0, t1) = aRaP exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
(t0− t1)
]
(10)
In other words, protention in eq. (4) may be considered as a product of a function of
time t, exp
[
τR−τP
τRτP (t− t0)
]
, modulated by constants and characteristic times, of a physical
inertia Iϕ(t0, t1) and of a “biological inertia” I(t0, t1). This last coefficient is also indepen-
dent of t, but depends on the specific organism by the various indexed constants.
The physical inertia represents the “passive” decay of a physical relaxation phenom-
ena, which makes a perturabtion disappear during the return to equilibrium. On the con-
trary, the biological inertia coefficient is to be understood as a capacity to “carry over” the
protensive effect. Their names are freely inspired by the inertial mass as a coefficient of
acceleration (thus and very informally, biological inertia would be the biologically perti-
nent coefficient of protention). In section 4, by references and a discussion, we will say
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more about this new concept. First a few technicalities.
We have to check whether our definitions depend on the specific reference we choose.
That is to say if a time origin change:
t0← t˜0 = t0+∆t t1← t˜1 = t1+∆t t← t˜ = t+∆t (11)
changes the way we split P in three parts, in equation 4. It it then straightforward to see
that:
exp
[
τR− τP
τRτP
(t− t0)
]
= exp
[
τR− τP
τRτP
(t˜− t˜0)
]
(12)
exp
[
t0− t1
τR
]
= exp
[
t˜0− t˜1
τR
]
(13)
aRaP exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
(t0− t1)
]
= aRaP exp
[
(τR− τP)
τRτP
(t˜0− t˜1)
]
(14)
This means that each of this quantities have a sound biological meaning.
Inertia introduces a coefficient which is independent of t and is, in general, much
smaller than aRaP (and always smaller than aRaP). This coefficient contributes to the
dependence of P in function of t. In particular, it contributes in an essential manner to the
decrease of the protention according to the temporal distance.
3.1 Analysis
0
1
2
3
4
0, 0 0, 2 0, 4 0, 6 0, 8 1, 0
(c)
αR(c). αP (c).
0
1
2
3
(t1 − t0)
c = 1 c = 0.8
c = 0.2 c = 0.01
Figure 4: Biological inertia. LEFT: we plot the factor of the characteristic time of
biological inertia seen as protention (or retention). RIGHT: biological inertia as a function
of the length of the time interval for various values of c.
In order to better understand the sense we attribute to this “inertia” of living phenom-
ena, given our preceding remark regarding orders of magnitude respective of character-
istic times, we may focus on the ratio c of figure 3, that is on c such that τP = cτR. We
consider 0≤ c≤ 1 and rewrite I in the equivalent form:
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I(t1− t0) = aRaP exp
[
(1− c)
cτR
(t0− t1)
]
(15)
= aRaP exp
[
1
αR(c)τR
(t0− t1)
]
with αR(c) =
c
(1− c) (16)
Then I has the form of a “long term retention” if c > 0.5 or a “short term retention” if
c < 0.5. Conversely, and maybe even more intuitively, inertia can be also interpreted (by
writing τR =
τp
c and eliminating this time τR) as a “long term virtual protention” :
I(t1− t0) = aRaP exp
[
(1− c)
τP
(t0− t1)
]
(17)
= aRaP exp
[
1
αP(c)τP
(t0− t1)
]
with αP(c) =
1
(1− c) (18)
Biological inertia would then be both an extended retention, eq. (15), and a virtual
protention, eq. (17), which are both independent of the time t of the action: in fact, it
depends only on the instants that are relevant to the event retained and occurring in t0
or which is the object of an expectation (protention towards t1). It is therefore an inertia
which “carries over” the life form from t0 towards t1, by the preservation of its own struc-
ture and its relationship with the environment (see section 4).
The τR = τP case
It can be observed that in the case where the characteristic retention and virtual proten-
tion times are equal (τR = τP = τ where the c from the equation above is equal to 1), the
protention P becomes aRaP exp
[
(t0−t1)
τ
]
and is therefore independent of the present obser-
vation time t. This, of course, within the interval between the moment of the occurrence
of the event in question and the moment t1 where it is mobilized again (since we still have
t0 < t < t1 ). But then, according still to hypothesis c = 1, one has P = aRaP exp
[
(t0−t1)
τ
]
,
with I(t0, t1) = aRaP. Thus, when (τR = τP), only inertia is present in protention.
We can also note this situation by considering that if the observation time t is close to
the instant t0 of the occurrence of the event (recent retention), then the temporal interval
for a virtual protention, (t − t1) ≈ (t0− t1), increases; conversely, if time t is far from
t0 (remote retention), the temporal interval involved in this virtual protention and within
which the latter plays its role (the future of the observation moment t) diminishes in
importance, given of course that the protention P as such remains independent of t, in this
case.
These remarks are meant to highlight the fact that, in the latter case, the intensity P
of the protention remains invariant, whereas the duration upon which virtual protention
takes place — the future of t — can change in size: t1− t.
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4 References and more justifications for biological iner-
tia
We have come to propose a mathematical notion of biological inertia through an appar-
ently arbitrary play of symmetries and calculations, of which we would now like to better
explain the meaning and the objectives. To emphasize the importance of the concept, but
without wanting to make excessive and uncontrolled analogies with immensely illustrious
precedents, let’s note that modern physics started off with a good analysis of inertia, as a
“pursuing a state” without aim nor teleology: Galilean inertia4.
In biology, this notion can already be found, although rarely, under various forms.
For Vaz and Varela (1978) “the lymphoid system has an inertia, which resists attempts
to induce sudden and profound deviations in the course of events”. So this is a weak
notion of inertia, close to the “persistence” of structural stability. Likewise, we could
talk about inertia in the case of the notion of “dynamic core” presented in Edelman and
Tononi (2000), because it also refers to the continuity/persistence of individuation (see
also Le Van Quyen (2003)). This theme is also used by Varela (1997), where the term of
inertia appears also in the attempt to grasp the “force”, specific to any organism, enabling
its “bringing forth of an identity”.
In our approach, which is inspired by the methods of physics without identifying with
it, we firstly define retention by a relaxation function, which is a physical notion — which
can even be considered as adequate to describe the “memory” to which some often re-
fer in relation to certain physico-chemical activities. Virtual protention is given then by
a temporal symmetry, modulo some adjustment coefficients; this notion, which has no
analogy in physics, is by this, and at least, the “projective” reflection of retention. Pro-
tention follows, as a linear combination of these two values, in function of time. Then,
by a simple algebraic device, we separate the part containing the temporal variable from
the functional definition: what remains is a constant, a function of all other parameters
(characteristic times, specific constants, interval range), which we called biological iner-
tia. As we pointed out, when retention and protention have the same characteristic times
(τR = τP), inertia coincides with protention. We would then say that this is the simplest
situations from a cognitive viewpoint: the organism can only anticipate by means of iner-
tia. In any case, the proposed notion of inertia appears to clearly specify the informal idea
of “bringing forth of an identity”, with the reference to retention and to protention, at the
minimal cognitive level.
But why would this inertia not simply correspond to the fact of following a geodesic
trajectory, like in physics? Some will say that the amoeba, the paramecium, etc., follow
a gradient in the same way that a physical object follows the trajectory dictated by the
Hamiltonian (through the principle of least action). It may appear that such is the case in
in vitro experiments where, within a highly purified environment, the unicellular organ-
ism is exposed to one or two very specific gradients (chemical, thermal . . . ). On the other
hand, in an in vivo situation, in the ecosystems preferred by such animalcules (and which
are very polluted, from our standpoint) they must “arbitrate” between qualitatively dif-
4Without forgetting Giordano Bruno who had an informal yet quite relevant notion of inertia, a few years
prior to Galileo. It then became possible to understand planetary movements without God being required
to push the planets around at all times. We similarly aim at a concept of inertia for living phenomena with
no reference to “vital impetus” or divine thrust.
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ferent stimuli: several physico-chemical gradients, an edible and close bacterium that is
not too large, another smaller one, etc. Now the paramecium, say, appears to “learn” (see
[Mislin, 2004]), that is, it enjoys at least retention, which contributes to protention (and,
after reading Mislin and references, one could posit for it τR > τP, or even τR  τP)5.
And it is difficult to conceive of learning without error, or without several attempts and
without the memory of these attempts (retention), even if such memory is extremely rudi-
mentary. The subsequent action is therefore one among many possible ones, from the
standpoint of the ecosystem, because it also depends on the specificity of individual re-
tention (experience). Among these many possible trajectories, the one it follows has only
to be compatible with the ecosystem. No gradient or physical geodesic is adequate to
describe this plurality of possibilities of evolution, phylogenesis, ontogenesis and of ac-
tion, which also depends on the specificity, hence on the history, of the species or of the
individual (retention and biological inertia). Our modest inertial attempt tries to do this,
in a way that is as preliminary as mathematically simple.
We can interpret the growth of (τR− τP) ≥ 0 as a greater cognitive “complexity”. It
appears that the protention, when τR τP, must account for more “experience” in order
to achieve the objective of the action; it depends upon a greater amount of lived and re-
tained history, and hence on a greater specificity (individuality) of the living object. So it
better participates to the incessant process of individuation, which is a play between the
richness of retention and the diversity of possible future trajectories.
Another way to associate a growth of complexity to the growth of (τR− τP)≥ 0, is to
consider cases where the global protention is constant. Then the increase of (τR−τP)≥ 0
means that protention is more localized near t1, with the same global effect. Then this
situation is more “complex”, since the preparation to the virtual event occurs when it is
closer (and the organism must be “quickly ready”). In this case, it is easier for it to protend
another event t ′1, with t
′
1 between t0 and t1, since the organism is not yet fully focused on
t1 (the P grows very slowly “for long” and fastly increases only close to t1). This situation
allows the organism to have longer times of correlation: during the early part of these
extended protentional activities, it may prepare also for other events .
5 Towards human cognition. From trajectory to space:
The continuity of the cognitive phenomena
The continuity of space-time, which the mathematics of continua proposes and structures
in a remarkable way, from Euclid to Cantor, follows — and does not precede — the con-
tinuity of a figure, of a contour or of a trajectory. Euclidean geometry is not a geometry
of space, it is a geometry of figures, with continuous edges, constructed by means of
ruler and compass and submitted to translations and to rotations. It is much later, with
Descartes, that geometry finds its constitutive environment in an abstract space, underly-
ing and independent from the figures which evolve within. The analytical reconstruction
of Euclidean geometry will follow, by means of this ideal framework, an algebraico-
5A paramecium manages the movements of about 2,000 cilia during highly complex swimming activi-
ties; some of its cilia also serve to direct food towards a “mouth” (opening upon the membrane), by means
of very articulate movements.
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geometrical continuum, organized in Cartesian coordinates. Then, since Cantor, we have
a fantastic reconstruction of the underlying continuum, a possible one, though (see Law-
vere and Bell for an alternative topos-theoretic approach, with no points, Bell (1998) ).
Let’s now try to grasp a possible constitutive path or even a cognitive foundation of
this phenomenal continuum which is the privileged conceptual and mathematical tool for
the intelligibility of space, on the basis of our analysis of retention and of protention.
The recent analyses of the primary cortex (see Petitot (2008) for a survey) highlight
the role of intracortical synaptic linkages in the perceptual construction of edges and
of trajectories. Neurons correlate themselves locally, along “association fields” (Field
(1987); Field et al (1993)) composed of smooth (differentiable) curves that “are grouped
toghether only when alignement fails along particular axes” Field et al (1993). These
neurons are sensitive to “directions”: that is, they activate when detecting a direction,
along a tangent. Then they (pre-)activate other neurons in the association field (they
prepare in advance the spike which is not yet fired). This preactivation of associated
neurons is, in our view, a component of the protensive activity. Then, neuronal activation
follows a specific direction which (re-)constructs the pertinent line, Petitot (2008).
Thus, the continuity of an edge or of a trajectory is constructed by “gluing” together
fragments of the world, in the precise geometrical (differential) sense of gluing. In other
words, we force by continuity the unity of an edge by relating neurons which are pre-
associated and are, locally, along particular axes.
This phenomenon participates in the retention and the protention of a non-existing
line, a trajectory say, by “integrating”, in the mathematical sense, the tangents that are lo-
cally associated in the field. The related inertial phenomena of the activation/deactivation
of neurons may be one of its constitutive elements, with inertia as a coefficient of proten-
tion. The retention of occular movements or saccades which follow a moving body, an
edge, should also be quoted: this retentive/protensive phenomenon originates in the mus-
cles enabling the saccades or in the neurons managing them. As for the case of protention,
in particular, there are protentional displacements in the receptor field of the cortical neu-
rons that precede the saccades (Berthoz (2002)). The brain prepares itself and anticipates
a moving object, of which the movement is perceived following an occular saccade, or of
which the trajectory or edge is perceived by running the eye along or over it. This is, in
our view, the keystone of a fundamental protentional activity.
Now, we propose the following conjecture. First, the World is not continuous, nor
discrete: it is what it is. Since Newton and Cantor, by continuous tools, or, now, in Quan-
tum theories and Topos Theoretic approaches, we mathematically organized it in various
ways, possibly over different “backgrounds”. In our view, the phenomenal continuity of
trajectories, of an edge, is due to the retention of that trajectory, edge, scanned by the eye,
which is “glued” with the protention by the very unit of the cerebral and global physio-
logical activity (the vestibular system, for example, has its own retention and inertia).
In the case of contours, the specific saccades along the direction of movement or to-
wards the extreme of a reconstructed segment (for example in Kanizsa triangles, see Pe-
titot (2008)) stimulates a specific activation in the association field (a specific connection
between neurons in the field).
It would then be this “gluing” — a mathematically solid concept (at the center of
differential geometry, of which Riemannian geometry is a special case) — that entails the
cognitive effect which imposes continuity upon the world: the image of the object and
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of its past position is reassembled (glued by the conjunction of protention and retention)
with that of the object and of its expected position or a contour is made continuous even
when non existing (as in Kanizsa illusions). We could indeed imagine that an animal with
no fovea (the part of the eye which enables a follow up of a target by a continuous focus),
a frog for example, and which takes spaced out snapshots of an object in movement would
not have the impression of a continuous movement in the way in which we, the primates,
“see” it.
By measuring relaxation and (pre-)activation times of associated neurons it should be
possible to quantify our coefficients in these specific phenomena. Inertial coefficients in
particular would yield different values according to the different protentional capacities
in different species (frogs for example may have no inertia w.r. to these phenomena, if
our understanding above is correct).
So the continuity of a trajectory or of an edge is, in our opinion, the result of a spatio-
temporal reassembling of the retentions and protentions that are managed by global neural
activity in the presence of a plurality of activities of such type (muscles, vestibular sys-
tem . . . but also the differentiable continuity of the movement or gesture participates by
means of its own play of retention/protention). In short, by a cognitive process of glue-
ing, we attribute continuity to phenomena which are what they are (and which a frog
surely sees quite differently). Then, by a remarkable conceptual and mathematical effort
having required centuries, we have even come to theorize, as abstract lines, surfaces and
their edges, first, and then even the continuity of environing space, as the background
of these structures. And this is the consequence, we believe, not the cause of the cogni-
tive/perceptive continuity of the movement and of the gesture, which is instead grounded
on the unity of protention and retention (note that, in this perspective, the continuity of an
edge would also be the continuity of a movement: the movement of the saccade or of the
hand caressing it, both retained and protended).
Let’s note that, in our attempt towards spatialization of time for living phenomena, in
this paper and in Bailly et al (2011), — a spatialization which, although schematic, should
contribute to its intelligibility — we have proceeded, in this section, along the opposite
approach: a sort of temporalization of space. Its apparent continuity would be the result of
a cognitive activity on time, the extended present obtained by rentention and protention.
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